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Abstract
We model a symmetric duopoly where …rms choose whether to
be quantity setters or price setters by deciding the optimal capacity;
undertake R&D activity to determine the degree of di¤erentiation;
and …nally compete in the market. Two games are proposed, where
investment decisions follow di¤erent sequences. We assess price and
quantity decisions, …nding a set of equilibria where the choice of the
market variable is a¤ected by both technological commitments. As
a result, the acquired wisdom that quantity setting is a dominant
strategy for …rms, while price setting is a dominant strategy from a
social standpoint, may not be con…rmed.
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1 Introduction
The interplay between technological choices and market behaviour in oligopoly
models has been studied along two alternative routes. The …rst has empha-
sized the link between the shape of competition prevailing on the market and
…rms’ incentives to invest either in process or in product innovation. The sec-
ond concerns the in‡uence of capacity constraints on market equilibrium.
Most literature on R&D races in oligopoly deals with the evaluation of
incentives to undertake cost reducing investments as the number of …rms
changes. This Schumpeterian approach holds that a major factor determining
the pace of technological progress is market structure (amongst the countless
contributions in this vein, see Arrow, 1962; Loury; 1979; Lee and Wilde, 1980;
Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Delbono and Denicolò, 1991; for an overview
see Reinganum, 1989).
An established result on cost reducing investment in oligopolistic markets
under perfect certainty states that there is excess expenditure in R&D under
Cournot competition, and conversely under Bertrand competition, due to
the opposite slopes of reaction functions at the market stage (Brander and
Spencer, 1983; Dixon, 1985). An extension of these results to the case of dif-
ferentiated products can be found in Bester and Petrakis (1993). They main-
tain that the incentive to invest in cost reducing innovation depends upon
the degree of product substitutability. Under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition, underinvestment, as compared to the social optimum, obtains
when products are fairly imperfect substitutes, while the opposite may oc-
cur when products are su¢ciently similar. Cournot competition provides a
lower (respectively, higher) incentive to innovate than Bertrand competition
if substitutability is high (respectively, low). As a result, social welfare may
be higher under Cournot than under Bertrand competition (Delbono and
Denicolò, 1990; Qiu, 1997).
While the R&D literature investigates the in‡uence of market competi-
tion on the optimal investment, contributions on capacity constraints follow a
reverse route. They analyse how plant size determines the intensity of mar-
ket competition (Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983;
Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Davidson and Deneckere, 1986). When …rms
have enough capacity to serve the whole market a Bertrand equilibrium ob-
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tains. If capacity is binding, the Cournot outcome emerges. Deneckere and
Kovenock (1996) prove that, under cost asymmetry, there is an incentive for
the more e¢cient …rm to drive the opponent out of business. This prevents
the market from reaching a Cournot equilibrium.1
The main purpose of this paper is to bridge these two streams of literature
in order to investigate the e¤ect of technological choices on the shape of
market competition, i.e., on …rms’ incentives to set either prices or quantities.
As far as R&D is concerned, a priori, there is no clearcut intuition as
to how the shape of market competition can a¤ect product innovation, i.e.,
investment aimed at reducing product substitutability. A preliminary result
can be found in Lambertini and Rossini (1998), who show that a Prisoner’s
Dilemma can be responsible for product homogeneity in a binary model of
investment in product innovation, followed by either Bertrand or Cournot
competition. Here we extend the analysis to the case in which both R&D
and capacity are continuous variables. The choice of capacity strategically
anticipates the equilibrium output set according to the market variable cho-
sen. As a result, in our model, capacity never binds, since it is endogenously
set. Therefore, the optimal choice of capacity plays the role of a commit-
ment of …rms as to the market variable. We propose two alternative games.
The …rst describes a symmetric duopoly where …rms choose whether to be
quantity setters or price setters, i.e., they …x capacity, then determine the
reciprocal degree of di¤erentiation through R&D, and …nally compete in the
market. In the second game, the …rst two stages follow a reverse order.
We are then able to reassess the choice between price and quantity. So
far, the established wisdom in this respect (Singh and Vives, 1984) maintains
that …rms prefer to play a Cournot game because quantity setting is a dom-
inant strategy for any given degree of substitutability. By introducing two
additional stages, where …rms undertake irreversible commitments, we …nd
a richer set of equilibria, where the choice of the market variable is a¤ected
by technology. In neither of the two games Singh and Vives’s result neces-
sarily holds. When the R&D decision is taken at the second stage, goods
are characterised by di¤erent degrees of substitutability in each subgame.
There are parameter ranges wherein symmetric Cournot behaviour either is
not an equilibrium or is not unique. When, instead, the R&D e¤ort takes
1A subset of this literature concerns repeated games with capacity constraints (Brock
and Scheinkman, 1985; Benoit and Krishna, 1987; Lambson, 1987; Davidson and De-
neckere, 1990).
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place at the …rst stage, it does not in‡uence the choice of the market vari-
able, uniquely determined by the tradeo¤ between revenue and the cost of
capacity.
Some unconventional results in terms of social welfare are due to the
capacity-intensive character of Bertrand competition. This may relieve the
Cournot equilibrium from its social ine¢ciency. Moreover, we identify para-
meter sets, where the duopoly equilibrium may also be socially optimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model and
the market stage are described in section 2. The two games and optimal
investment behaviour are dealt with in section 3. In section 4, the welfare
analysis is carried out. Concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 The model and the market stage
We describe a duopoly where …rms noncooperatively play a one-shot three-
stage game where they …rst choose the market variable, then determine their
respective e¤orts in product innovation, and, …nally, noncooperatively opti-
mize w.r.t. the market variable chosen at the …rst stage. Firms play simulta-
neously in every stage. They may compete symmetrically either in quantities
or in prices, or asymmetrically, one being a quantity setter while the other is
a price setter. We also consider an alternative ordering of stages, where the
determination of the R&D e¤ort occurs at the …rst stage and the choice of
the market variable is made at the second. As in the previous case, the third
stage describes the market game.
The demand side is a simpli…ed version of Dixit (1979) and Singh and
Vives (1984). The symmetric demand functions under Cournot and Bertrand
competition are, respectively
pi = 1¡ qi ¡ °qj (1)
qi =
1
1 + °
¡ pi
1¡ °2 +
°pj
1¡ °2 (2)
In the asymmetric case, where …rm i is a quantity setter, while …rm j is a
price setter, demand functions are:
pi = 1¡ qi + °(pj + °qi ¡ 1) (3)
qj = 1¡ pj ¡ °qi (4)
4
Parameter ° 2 (0; 1] represents product substitutability as perceived by con-
sumers, depending upon the products …rms supply. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that unit cost is constant and equal to zero, so that indi-
vidual pro…t gross of investment coincides with revenue RIJi = piqi; where
IJ 2 fPP;QQ; PQ;QPg indicates the kind of competition prevailing at the
market stage. The binary choice between a price or a quantity strategy entails
setting up a capacity at the cost xIJ 2 ©xPP ; xQQ; xQP ; xPQª ; i.e., choosing
a plant size which is optimal in any possible market subgame, which we now
solve by backward induction. Straightforward calculations lead to:
qQQi =
1
2 + °
2
·
1
3
;
1
2
¶
; qPPi =
1
2 + ° ¡ °2 2
·
4
9
;
1
2
¸
8° 2 (0; 1] ; (5)
qPQi =
2¡ ° ¡ °2
4¡ 3°2 2
·
0;
1
2
¶
; qQPi =
2¡ °
4¡ 3°2 2 [0:454; 1] ; (6)
RQQi =
1
(2 + °)2
2
·
1
9
;
1
4
¶
; (7)
RPPi =
1¡ °
(2¡ °)2(1 + °) 2
·
0;
1
4
¶
; (8)
RQPi =
(° ¡ 2)2(1¡ °2)
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 2
·
0;
1
4
¶
; RPQj =
(° ¡ 1)2(° + 2)2
(3°2 ¡ 4)2 2
·
0;
1
4
¶
:
(9)
On the basis of the above quantities, the following chain of inequalities can
be established:
qQPi > q
PP
i > q
QQ
i > q
PQ
i 8° 2 (0; 1]: (10)
This reveals that, given the variable chosen by …rm j, the output of …rm i
as a quantity setter is larger than her output as a price setter. Moreover,
industry output under symmetric Bertrand behaviour is higher than in the
alternative settings. Accordingly, the same sequence of inequalities must hold
for capacities and their corresponding cost:
xQPi > x
PP
i > x
QQ
i > x
PQ
i 8° 2 (0; 1]; 2xPP ¸ xQP+xPQ > 2xQQ 8° 2 (0; 1]:
(11)
As to revenues it is known from Singh and Vives (1984) that RQPi ¸ RPPi
and RQQi > R
PQ
i 8° 2 (0; 1]; implying that quantity setting is the dominant
strategy if the choice between price and quantity relies on revenue only.
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Hence, there exists a trade-o¤ between the cost of installing the plant and the
revenues associated with size itself. The above discussion can be summarized
in the following:
Lemma 1 Quantity setting revenue-dominates price setting, while price set-
ting capacity-dominates quantity setting.
We are now in a position to tackle the issue of the R&D technology. A
priori, parameter ° can be considered as an empty box to be …lled by …rms’
choices.2 At the second stage, …rms may either costlessly produce perfect
substitutes (with ° = 1), or di¤erentiated products if at least one of them
undertakes R&D activity. We adopt a general characterization of the R&D
technology, ° = °(ki; kj); where ki is the R&D investment of …rm i, with
ki 2 [0; kmax); kmax de…ning the amount of investment giving rise to two
independent monopolies. For simplicity of notation, in the remainder of the
paper we use °i and °ii to indicate @°=@ki and @
2°=@k2i ; respectively. The
R&D function is symmetric between the two …rms, and °i · 0; °ii ¸ 0:
Pro…ts are ¼IJi = R
IJ
i ¡ki¡xIJi :We assume that ¼IJi is continuous and twice
di¤erentiable w.r.t. ki for all ° 2 (0; 1]: Under the assumption that, initially,
° = 1; in order for investment to take place, it must be @¼IJi =@ki > 0 for at
least one …rm. An interior solution of the Nash game at the investment stage
exists if there is at least a pair (ki; kj) such that ° 2 (0; 1); @¼IJi =@ki = 0 and
@2¼IJi =@k
2
i · 0 for both …rms. A su¢cient condition for asymptotic stability
is that (@2¼IJi =@k
2
i )
2 ¸ (@2¼IJi =@ki@kj)2:
3 Two alternative games
Here we describe two alternative games where
² At the …rst stage, by choosing the strategic market variable from the set
V = fP;Qg; …rms set capacity xIJi . At the second stage they choose the
optimal R&D e¤ort ki: At the last stage they compete in the market.
² At the …rst stage, …rms undertake R&D activity. At the second stage
they choose capacity, while the third stage remains the same.
2The unit interval assumed for ° describes a symmetric horizontal di¤erentiation equiv-
alent to that arising in Hotelling’s (1929) linear city, as long as, in the latter, …rms play
simultaneously. See the discussion in Harrington (1995).
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3.1 The …rst game
The tree for the …rst game is illustrated in …gure 1.
Figure 1 : Game I
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The explicit solution of every subgame of the third stage is already known
from the previous section. Here we deal with the second stage of the game,
where …rms decide the optimal level of investment ki in product innovation.
3.1.1 Incentive to innovate under Cournot competition
When both …rms are quantity setters, the relevant revenue functions are
given by (7). First and second order conditions w.r.t. ki are:
@¼QQi
@ki
= ¡
µ
1 +
2°i
(2 + °)3
¶
= 0; (12)
@2¼QQi
@k2i
= 3°2i ¡ °ii(2 + °) · 0: (13)
We can implicitly de…ne optimal investment behaviour by solving (12), ob-
taining °i = ¡(2 + °)3=2; which is negative for all ° 2 (0; 1]: Substituting
and rearranging, (13) simpli…es to °ii ¸ 3(2+°)5=4: If we consider @¼QQi =@ki
at both the lower and the upper bound of the admissible investment range,
de…ned respectively by ki = 0 (and ° = 1) and kmax (° = 0); we characterize
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the su¢cient conditions for an interior solution to exist. When ° = 1; there
is an incentive to start investing in di¤erentiation if @¼QQi =@kij°=1 > 0; i.e.,
j°ij > 27=2: If this does not hold, a corner solution may obtain at ki = 0;
involving ° = 1: If R&D productivity is not su¢ciently high, an externality
e¤ect prevents …rms from investing.
As products tend to become completely independent, i.e., ° tends to zero,
we have
lim
°!0
@¼QQi
@ki
= ¡2 (°i + 4) < 0 =) j°ij < 4: (14)
If the above condition is violated, a corner solution may arise as ki tends to
kmax and ° tends to zero. When @¼
QQ
i =@kij°=1 > 0 and lim
°!0
@¼QQi =@ki > 0;
a su¢cient condition for an interior solution to exist is ¼QQi j°=1 ¸lim
°!0
¼QQi ;
which holds if kmax ¸ 5=36:
3.1.2 Incentive to innovate under Bertrand competition
Under symmetric price setting behaviour, the relevant revenue functions are
given by (8). First and second order conditions w.r.t. ki are:
@¼PPi
@ki
=
3°(° ¡ 1)°i
(° ¡ 2)3(1 + °)2 ¡
°i
4¡ 3°2 + °3 ¡ 1 = 0; (15)
@2¼PPi
@k2i
= 2
£
3°i(1¡ 3° + °2 ¡ °3) + °¶i(° ¡ 2¡ 2°3 + °4)
¤ · 0: (16)
From (15) we obtain
°i =
(° ¡ 2)3(° + 1)2(4¡ 3°2 + °3)
3°(° ¡ 1)¡ (° ¡ 2)3(° + 1)2 < 0 8° 2 (0; 1]: (17)
Plugging (17) into (16), the second order condition (SOC) simpli…es as fol-
lows:
°ii ¸
3(° ¡ 2)4(° + 1)2(1¡ 3° + °4 ¡ °3)
7° ¡ 8¡ 7°3 + 2°4 + 6°5 ¡ 5°6 + °7 > 0 8° 2 (0:3611; 1]: (18)
The above condition implies that the SOC is always met for ° 2 (0; 0:3611]:
We now characterize the su¢cient conditions for an interior solution to
exist. Consider @¼PPi =@ki at ki = 0 (and ° = 1) and kmax (° = 0): At the
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outset, under complete substitutability, …rm i starts investing in di¤erenti-
ation if @¼PPi =@kij°=1 > 0; i.e., j°ij > 2: Otherwise, a corner solution may
obtain at ki = 0; involving ° = 1:
As products tend to become completely independent, i.e., ° tends to zero,
we have that lim
°!0
@¼PPi =@ki < 0 if j°ij < 4: This obviously coincides with
(14), since the requirement for products to become completely independent
is unrelated with the strategic variable. Again, if this condition is not met,
a corner solution may arise as ki tends to kmax and ° tends to zero. When
@¼PPi =@kij°=1 > 0 and lim
°!0
@¼PPi =@ki > 0; a su¢cient condition for an interior
solution to obtain is ¼PPi j°=1 ¸lim
°!0
¼PPi ; which holds if kmax ¸ 1=4:
3.1.3 Incentive to innovate in the mixed setting
We now deal with the mixed case where, say, …rm i is a quantity setter and
…rm j is a price setter. The FOCs at the investment stage are, respectively:
@¼QPi
@ki
=
8(8 + 2°i ¡ 3°°i)¡ °2(27°4 ¡ 108°2 + 12°2°i ¡ 34°°i + 12°i + 144)
(3°2 ¡ 4)3 = 0
(19)
@¼PQj
@kj
=
12°(°2 + ° ¡ 2)2°j
(4¡ 3°2)3 +
2(1 + 2°)(°2 + ° ¡ 2)°j
(4¡ 3°2)2 ¡ 1 = 0: (20)
From (20) it can be veri…ed that @¼PQj =@kjj°=1 = ¡1; which implies that the
price setting …rm initially does not invest. As to the quantity setting …rm,
@¼QPi =@kij°=1 > 0 for all j°ij > 1=2: This entails that, at the outset, the
quantity setter …nds it easier to start investing if the rival is a price setter,
than in the symmetric situation where both …rms are quantity setters. This
can be given the following interpretation. On the one hand, the quantity
setter has a higher incentive since RQPi > R
PQ
j for all ° 2 (0; 1): Intuitively,
when ° = 1; the quantity setter is unable to internalize the strategic advan-
tage implicit in setting an output level in the market stage, because product
homogeneity drives the price down to marginal cost and consequently the
output to the level corresponding to perfect competition and zero pro…ts.
On the other hand, the price setter never starts investing in di¤erentiation
because she exploits the positive spillover exerted by the R&D e¤ort of the
quantity setter.
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The SOC for the quantity setter is
@2¼QPi
@k2i
= 3(°i)
2
¡
16¡ 32° ¡ 8°2 + 56°3 ¡ 51°4 + 12°5¢+
+°ii
¡
48° ¡ 32 + 48°2 ¡ 104°3 + 6°4 + 51°5 ¡ 18°6¢ · 0: (21)
Simple calculations su¢ce to establish that
@2¼QPi
@k2i
j°=1 _ ¡21(°i)2 ¡ °ii · 0; (22)
which is always true.
To complete the characterization of the interior solution for the quantity
setter, observe that obviously lim
°!0 @¼
QP
i =@ki < 0 if j°ij < 4: Finally, when
@¼QPi =@kij°=1 > 0 and lim
°!0
@¼QPi =@ki > 0; a su¢cient condition for an interior
solution to obtain is ¼QPi j°=1 ¸lim
°!0
¼QPi ; which holds if kmax ¸ 1=4:
3.1.4 The reduced form
We are now in the position to solve the …rst stage of the game, whereby
each …rm chooses to act either as a quantity setter or as a price setter. The
reduced form of the game is described by matrix 1.
j
P Q
i P ¼PPi ; ¼
PP
j ¼
PQ
i ; ¼
QP
j
Q ¼QPi ; ¼
PQ
j ¼
QQ
i ; ¼
QQ
j
Matrix 1
Suppose that at least one of the subgames represented in the above matrix
yields an interior solution where either one or both …rms invest in product
di¤erentiation, i.e., exclude the situations where ° = 1 or ° = 0 in all
subgames. The choice of market variable is driven by the incentive to invest in
product di¤erentiation, which in turn depends on the marginal productivity
of capital, °i and °j: As to the investment behaviour of …rm i, the relevant
parameter space can be divided into three regimes:
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1. j°ij > 27=2: In this region, at least one …rm invests in product dif-
ferentiation, independently of downstream competition. The e¢ciency of
technology is high enough to trigger investment regardless of the level of
spillover exerted on the rival.
2. j°ij 2 (2; 27=2]: In this region, investment is observed in all cases but
in the symmetric Cournot setting.
3. j°ij 2 (1=2; 2]: In this region, mixed cases give rise to investment at
least by the quantity setter. When ° = 1; the price setter does not invest.
However, we cannot exclude that the behaviour of the quantity setter triggers
investment by the price setter for some ° 2 (0; 1):
4. j°ij 2 (0; 1=2]: In this region no …rm invests. As a result, market com-
petition takes place in homogeneous products, due to extremely low marginal
productivity of the R&D activity.
A straightforward consequence of the above discussion is:
Lemma 2 At the outset, under product homogeneity, the incentive to invest
of a quantity setter is higher when the rival is a price setter. The opposite
holds for the price setter.
As to the choice of the market variable, one may wonder whether the well
known result of Singh and Vives (1984) holds true in the present setting. We
prove the following:
Theorem 1 (A) Suppose j°ij 2 (0; 1=2]: Hence, ° = 1; and the …rst stage of
the game (i) is a Prisoner’s Dilemma with a unique Nash equilibrium (P; P )
if xQQi ¡ xPQi > 1=9; (ii) is a coordination game with two Nash equilibria,
(P; P ) and (Q;Q), if xQQi ¡ xPQi < 1=9: (B) Suppose (i) j°ij 2 (1=2; 2]; (ii)¯¯
°j
¯¯ 2 [0; 2:3326]; and (iii) RQPi ¡ ki > xQP ¡ xPP : The reduced form of
the game is a chicken game with two Nash equilibria, (P;Q) and (Q;P ); if
RPQi ¡ 1=9 > xPQ ¡ xQQ: A su¢cient condition for this to obtain is ° 2
(0; 2=3):
Proof. (A) If j°ij 2 (0; 1=2]; no …rm invests in product di¤erentiation
independently of the shape of market competition, which takes place with
homogeneous products. The reduced form is represented by matrix 2.
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j
P Q
i P ¡xPP ; ¡xPP ¡xPQ;¡xQP
Q ¡xQP ;¡xPQ 1=9¡ xQQ; 1=9¡ xQQ
Matrix 2
First, observe that 1=9¡ xQQ > ¡xPP and ¡xPP > ¡xQP : This excludes a
chicken game, giving rise to either a Prisoner’s Dilemma or a coordination
game. The former obtains if xQQi ¡ xPQi > 1=9; yielding price setting as a
strictly dominant strategy generating (P;P ) as the unique equilibrium. The
latter obtains if xQQi ¡ xPQi < 1=9: In this case, no dominant strategy exists
and both (P; P ) and (Q;Q) are equilibria, with (Q;Q) obviously dominating
(P; P ).
(B). Suppose (i) j°ij 2 (1=2; 2] and (ii) the reduction in ° resulting from
the quantity setter’s investment does not induce the price setter to undertake
R&D activity. To ensure this, consider the FOC (20) for the price setter at
the R&D stage, and solve it w.r.t. °j to obtain:
°¤j =
(4¡ 3°2)3
2(°2 + ° ¡ 2) [6°(°2 + ° ¡ 2) + (1 + 2°)(4¡ 3°2)] (23)
which takes its minimum at ° = 0:91693; where
¯¯
°¤j
¯¯
= 2:3326: As a conse-
quence,
¯¯
°j
¯¯ 2 [0; 2:3326] is a su¢cient condition for the price setter not to
invest. This case is shown in matrix 3.
j
P Q
i P ¡xPP ; ¡xPP RPQi ¡ xPQ; RQPj ¡ kj ¡ xQP
Q RQPi ¡ ki ¡ xQP ; RPQj ¡ xPQ 1=9¡ xQQ; 1=9¡ xQQ
Matrix 3
If RQPi ¡ ki > xQP ¡ xPP > 0 and RPQi ¡ 1=9 > xPQ ¡ xQQ; a chicken game
obtains. Notice that, as xPQ¡xQQ < 0; a su¢cient condition for RPQi ¡1=9 >
xPQ ¡ xQQ to hold is RPQi ¡ 1=9 = (° ¡ 1)2(° + 2)2=(3°2 ¡ 4)2 ¡ 1=9 > 0;
which is true for all ° 2 (0; 2=3):
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The asymmetry observed at equilibrium in terms of capacity in case B
is driven by the expectation on the part of the price setter of receiving a
positive externality from the quantity setter’s decision to invest in product
di¤erentiation at the ensuing R&D stage.3 The above discussion is su¢cient
to show that there may exist a non trivial parameter range where quantity
setting is not a dominant strategy, so that the choice of the market variable
may not follow the rule traced by Singh and Vives (1984). Analogous con-
siderations hold in the remainder of the range, i.e., for j°ij > 2: E.g., suppose
that j°ij 2 (2; 27=2]; in this range, investment is observed in all cases but the
symmetric Cournot one. For the latter to be the unique outcome of the game,
as a result of an equilibrium in dominant strategies, the following inequalities
must simultaneously hold:
¼QPi ¡ ¼PPi ¸ 0;
1
9
¡ ¼PQi ¸ xQQ: (24)
If both inequalities above are violated the unique equilibrium is (P; P ): If only
one of the two inequalities holds we end up with either a chicken game or a
coordination game. Our conclusions impinge upon the endogenisation of the
di¤erentiation parameter which is in‡uenced by the nature of downstream
competition. The di¤erent incentives to invest in product di¤erentiation
determine a result which is related to the relative size of revenues and/or
capacities.
3.2 The second game
Consider the alternative game, where the choice of the R&D e¤ort takes
place at the …rst stage of the game, while the choice between P and Q; i.e.,
the choice of capacity, is located at the second stage. Suppose, at the …rst
stage, …rms set a speci…c equilibrium level of ki and kj . In so doing, they …x
the numerical value of ° in the unit interval. Then, the choice between P
and Q is described by matrix 4.
3This resembles the analysis carried out by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) concerning entry deterrence.
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j
P Q
i P RPPi ¡ xPP ; RPPj ¡ xPP RPQi ¡ xPQ; RQPj ¡ xQP
Q RQPi ¡ xQP ; RPQj ¡ xPQ RQQi ¡ xQQ; RQQj ¡ xQQ
Matrix 4
Observe that the investment in product di¤erentiation is omitted from ma-
trix 4, as it is common to all payo¤s accruing to …rm i; and consequently it
is irrelevant as to the choice between P and Q: The inspection of matrix 4
reveals that the equilibrium of this game depends on the interplay between
the capacity-dominance of price-setting and the revenue-dominance of quan-
tity setting. Singh and Vives’s (1984) conclusion, that symmetric Cournot
behaviour should obtain in the unique equilibrium of their game, draws upon
the revenue-dominance of quantity setting, which can be o¤set by the costly
acquisition of capacity. As to the literature on Cournot equilibria under ca-
pacity constraints (Levitan and Shubik, 1972; Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983;
Davidson and Deneckere, 1986; Osborne and Pitchik, 1986), the above analy-
sis highlights the opportunity cost of building up capacity, and its role in
shaping endogenously market competition. As an illustration, consider the
following inequalities:
xQP ¡ xPP > RQP ¡RPP > 0; xQQ ¡ xPQ > RQQ ¡RPQ > 0: (25)
If the above inequalities hold, the unique equilibrium is (P; P ). Otherwise
the game in matrix 4 can have (Q;Q) as the unique equilibrium or be either
a chicken game, or a coordination game.
4 Welfare analysis
The foregoing analysis of …rms’ behaviour opens the question whether the
well established result that Bertrand competition yields the highest welfare
level should be expected to carry over to a setting where …rms invest in R&D
and productive capacity. Indeed, some contributions point out that this may
not happen when …rms’ R&D e¤orts are directed towards the attainment
of a process innovation (Delbono and Denicolò, 1990; Qiu, 1997). We show
below that similar results emerge when capacity is endogenously decided.
14
De…ne social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus plus net pro…ts,
i.e., SW IJ = CSIJ + ¦IJ ; where ¦IJ = ¼IJi + ¼
IJ
j : The established wisdom
states that price setting behaviour enhances consumer surplus, with CSPP ¸
CSPQ = CSQP > CSQQ 8° 2 (0; 1]. However, from (5-6), we know that
2qPP ¸ qQP + qPQ > 2qQQ 8° 2 (0; 1]; (26)
implying
2xPP ¸ xQP + xPQ > 2xQQ 8° 2 (0; 1]: (27)
As a consequence, we can state the following
Lemma 3 From a social standpoint, price setting surplus-dominates quan-
tity setting, while quantity setting capacity-dominates price setting.
Although we cannot derive explicit conclusions for both games and all
the relevant parameter subsets, we can unambiguously determine that there
exists at least one case where symmetric Bertrand behaviour is not socially
e¢cient. Consider the …rst game, where the choice of capacity takes place at
the …rst stage. The following obtains:
Proposition 1 Suppose j°ij 2 (0; 1=2]: A necessary and su¢cient condition
for the social optimality of symmetric Bertrand competition is (xPP ¡xQQ) 2
(0; 1=36): Otherwise, symmetric Cournot competition is socially optimal.
Proof. If j°ij 2 (0; 1=2]; we know from the previous section that …rms com-
pete in homogeneous products, irrespective of the strategic variables chosen
at the …rst stage. Given ° = 1, industry output is equal to one in all cases
except the symmetric Cournot; as a consequence, the cost of the overall
capacity used in the industry must be the same everywhere except in the
Cournot setting. Hence, from the social standpoint, relevant welfare levels
are represented in matrix 5.
j
P Q
i P 1=2¡ 2xPP 1=2¡ 2xPP
Q 1=2¡ 2xPP 4=9¡ 2xQQ
Matrix 5
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To prove the above Proposition, it su¢ces to observe that
1
2
¡ 2xPP > 4
9
¡ 2xQQ i¤ xPP ¡ xQQ < 1
36
: (28)
If the opposite obtains, i.e., xPP ¡ xQQ > 1=36; the tradeo¤ between con-
sumer surplus and the cost of capacity favours Cournot against Bertrand
competition.
Our next step in the welfare analysis consists in verifying whether there
exists any subset of the space de…ned by the cost of capacity, wherein the
privately optimal equilibrium chosen by …rms is socially e¢cient. We prove
the following
Proposition 2 Suppose j°ij 2 (0; 1=2] and xQQ < xPP : If (i) xQQ > xPP ¡
1=36; and (ii) xQQ > xPQ+1=9; the unique duopoly equilibrium (P;P ) is also
socially e¢cient. If (i) xQQ < xPP ¡ 1=36; and (ii) xQQ > xPQ + 1=9; the
unique duopoly equilibrium (Q;Q) is socially ine¢cient. If xQQ < xPQ+1=9;
…rms play a coordination game with two equilibria, (P; P ) and (Q;Q). When
xQQ > xPP ¡ 1=36; (P; P ) is socially e¢cient; otherwise (Q;Q) is socially
e¢cient.
Proof. To prove the above Proposition, we resort to a graphical exposition.
Figure 2 below is drawn in the space
©
xPP ; xQQ
ª
; for a given level of xPQ:
² In region ABCD, the duopoly equilibrium fP; Pg coincides with the
social optimum.
² In region BDE, the duopoly equilibrium is again fP; Pg; while the social
optimum is fQ;Qg:
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Figure 2 : Equilibrium analysis
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² In region 0ABF, the duopoly game has two equilibria, fP; Pg and
fQ;Qg; the former being socially optimal.
² In region BEFG, the duopoly game has two equilibria, fP; Pg and
fQ;Qg; the latter being socially optimal.
Consider now the second game where the choice of capacity takes place
at the second stage. On the basis of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, it can be
established that a con‡ict between social optimality and private optimality
exists as far as the market variable is concerned.
5 Conclusions
Adopting the same demand structure as in Singh and Vives (1984), we have
endogenised both the choice of capacity and the degree of product substi-
tutability by introducing two stages where …rms noncooperatively undertake
technological commitments before competing on the market. The conse-
quences are twofold. First, in both cases the investment behaviour of any
17
given …rm depends upon whether the rival is a quantity or a price setter.
Speci…cally, we have established that (i) given the market variable selected
by the rival, being a quantity setter is costlier than being a price setter; and
(ii) a quantity setter’s incentive to innovate is higher when the rival is a price
setter, while the opposite holds for a price setter. Second, a set of equilibria
emerges from the reduced form of the game, where …rms choose between price
and quantity. We have shown that, when the productivity of investment is
relatively low, the game exhibits two asymmetric equilibria in which one …rm
is a price setter and the other is a quantity setter, and only the latter invests
in di¤erentiation. In the remaining scenarios of innovation technology, the
equilibria are determined by the interplay between the level of investment
and the resulting level of di¤erentiation, vis à vis the comparison between
revenues and the cost of capacity.
Social welfare analysis suggests two considerations. First, symmetric price
competition is more expensive in terms of installed capacity. This implies
that Bertrand behaviour may not be socially e¢cient. Second, there are
conditions under which private incentives may lead …rms to play a socially
optimal equilibrium.
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